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INTRODUCTION
Some view multidistrict litigation as a "valuable way to handle mass tort
litigation;"' others view it as a process to be avoided at all costs. 2 Multidistrict
litigation is a polarizing practice, with staunch supporters and fierce opponents.
The proponents and opponents of the process appear to split cleanly into two
groups: defense counsel and plaintiffs' counsel, respectively.3 Naturally, like
most other procedural devices, whether one supports multidistrict litigation
depends upon whether the process has produced favorable outcomes for her
clients. Additionally, it seems plaintiffs' attorneys oppose multidistrict litiga-
tion-if for no other reason-because a plaintiff's presence in multidistrict liti-
gation means she has lost the battle to keep her tort claims in state court.4
Conversely, defendants' attorneys often celebrate transfer to multidistrict litiga-
tion because it often means-if nothing else-the defendant has won the battle
to remain in federal court.5 For this reason, it appears the polarization multidis-
trict litigation has created is nothing more than an extension of plaintiffs' gen-
eral preference to litigate in state court and defendants' preference to litigate in
federal court.6 Accordingly, opinions about multidistrict litigation seem to be
* J.D. candidate 2006, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
Desmond T. Barry, Jr., A Practical Guide to the Ins and Outs of Multidistrict Litigation,
64 DEF. COUNS. J. 58, 58 (1997).
2 Ellen A. Presby & Erin Anderson, How to Avoid Multidistrict Litigation and Keep Your
Cases in State Court, 2 Ann. 2004 AM. TRIAL LAW. Assoc. CONTINUING LEGAL EDtJC. 2175
(2004).
3 See id.; Barry, supra note 1, at 58.
4 See Presby & Anderson, supra note 2.
5 Jesse Tiko Smallwood, Note, Nationwide State Law Class Actions and the Beauty of Fed-
eralism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1176 (2003).
6 See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. Rev. 369, 417 (1992) ("Overall, 53.5% of
defense counsel cited the likelihood of a more favorable federal court legal ruling. Among
plaintiff attorneys, 25.3% cited expectations about favorable state court legal rulings.");
David A. Luigs, Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial
America 1870-1958, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1700, 1702 (1994) (book review) ("Removal to fed-
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inherently biased, and not necessarily related to the process's effectiveness as a
consolidation technique.
This Note purposefully ignores the question of whether rulings made in
multidistrict litigation are empirically pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. Instead,
the purpose of this Note is to analyze whether multidistrict litigation is an
effective consolidation technique by exploring whether the process serves its
fundamental goals of increasing convenience for parties and witnesses and pro-
moting the just and efficient conduct of cases. This Note will use diet drug
litigation, a controversy heavily litigated in the multidistrict forum, as a model
for analyzing the effectiveness of multidistrict litigation. In order to consider
whether multidistrict litigation serves its purposes, one must be familiar with
the background and operation of the process. To use diet drug litigation as an
appropriate model for analyzing the effectiveness of multidistrict litigation, one
must also be familiar with some of the background of diet drug litigation. Once
familiar with these two topics, one can then begin to explore whether multidis-
trict litigation fulfills its goals of increasing convenience and efficiency for
those involved in diet drug litigation.
Accordingly, section I of this Note discusses the history and function of
multidistrict litigation. Section II discusses the background of diet drug litiga-
tion. Finally, section III uses diet drug litigation as a model to establish that
multidistrict litigation is indeed an effective consolidation technique for some
of the parties involved, but certainly not for everyone.
I. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Multidistrict litigation is a procedure used, in the interests of justice, effi-
ciency, and convenience, for consolidating or coordinating actions pending in
various United States District Courts.7 Generally, when numerous cases with
complex, common questions of fact are pending simultaneously in federal dis-
trict courts, multidistrict litigation allows judges to transfer the cases to a single
district court for completion of all discovery and pretrial matters.8 Section I of
this Note discusses A) the history of multidistrict litigation, and B) how mul-
tidistrict litigation functions.
A. History of Multidistrict litigation
Congress created multidistrict litigation in 1968 when it enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407, which created a new method for consolidating similar cases during the
pretrial and discovery phase of litigation.9 Congress enacted the multidistrict
litigation statute in response to a government antitrust prosecution that spawned
over 1900 individual treble damage actions.' 0 The 1900 actions were pending
eral court made litigation more difficult, complex, expensive, time-consuming, and intimi-
dating for the individual plaintiffs.").
7 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
8 Id.
9 Id.
1o Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Reorganized, THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSL. OF
THE FED. CTS. (Fed. Judiciary), June 2000, at 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/june00ttb/jre
org.html.
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in thirty-six federal district courts and asserted 25,000 individual claims."' The
25,000 claims alleged a nationwide antitrust conspiracy among manufacturers
of electrical equipment. 12 That explosion of nearly identical, simultaneous liti-
gation prompted Congress to create a procedure that could minimize the incon-
veniences and duplicative efforts associated with litigating thousands of
drastically similar claims in dozens of courts across the nation. 13 The solution
Congress developed was multidistrict litigation. 4 Congress viewed multidis-
trict litigation as a consolidation technique that could increase "convenience of
parties and witnesses," as well as "promote the just and efficient conduct of...
actions. '15 Furthermore, federal courts have emphasized multidistrict litiga-
tion's additional benefit of eliminating conflicting, simultaneous rulings on
identical pretrial matters in various district courts. 16
Since the inception of multidistrict litigation, thousands of cases have
gone through the process, and its use is becoming increasingly common. 17
Since multidistrict litigation began in 1968, more than 179,071 civil actions
have been consolidated in multidistrict litigation pretrial proceedings. 18 In
1998 alone, 16,940 cases proceeded to multidistrict litigation.' 9 Despite its
widespread use, there has been very little general critique of multidistrict litiga-
tion in terms of whether it meets the goals Congress created it to serve.
B. How Multidistrict Litigation Works
Cases are ideal candidates for transfer to multidistrict litigation when there
are numerous cases with common questions of fact pending simultaneously in
various United States District Courts.2 ° Whether cases ultimately proceed to
multidistrict litigation is a decision made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation ("judicial panel" or "the panel"). 2 ' The judicial panel is the sole
judicial body that determines whether cases will be consolidated into multidis-
trict litigation proceedings. 2  The panel consists of seven circuit and/or district
judges selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. 23 The current judicial
panel consists of six district judges and one circuit judge: William Terrell
Hodges, Senior United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida;
D. Lowell Jensen, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District
of California; John F. Keenan, Senior United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York; Robert L. Miller, Jr., United States District
'' Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
16 E.g., In re IDT Corp. Calling Card Terms Litig., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1382 (J.P.M.L.
2003); Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 316 F. Supp. 837, 839 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
'" 2002 U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 26.
18 Id.
19 John F. Nangle, From the Horse's Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 341, 341 (1999).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
21 Id. § 1407(b).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 1407(d).
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Judge for the Northern District of Indiana; J. Frederick Motz, United States
District Judge for the District of Maryland; Kathryn H. Vratil, United States
District Judge for the District of Kansas; and David R. Hansen, United States
Court of Appeals Judge for the Eighth Circuit. 24 As the multidistrict litigation
statute requires, no two judges sitting on the panel preside in the same circuit.25
There is no set term dictating how long judges sit on the panel; however, a new
appointee may expect to serve approximately four to seven years.26 The panel
meets an average of one time every two months.27 This seven-judge panel
determines which cases to transfer to multidistrict litigation by a concurrence of
at least four of the seven judges.2 8
Transfer to multidistrict litigation may be initiated in one of two ways: by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, sua sponte, or by motion filed by
a party to the action.29 If a party to the action initiates transfer by motion, the
moving party must file the motion for transfer with the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation and must file a copy of the motion with the originating
district court.3 ° Regardless of whether transfer is initiated by the panel or by
the party, the judicial panel sends notice to all parties potentially affected by the
transferred proceedings. 3 The notice specifies when and where an evidentiary
hearing will occur to enable the panel to determine whether to transfer the cases
to multidistrict litigation.32 At the evidentiary hearing, all parties potentially
affected by transfer of proceedings may offer evidence either supporting or
opposing the practicability of transfer. 33
For cases to be appropriate for transfer to multidistrict litigation, there
must be many cases that share common questions pending in multiple federal
district courts.3 4 While there is no statutory minimum number of cases that
must share similar questions before the judicial panel will consolidate them into
multidistrict litigation proceedings, the number of similar cases is often in the
hundreds or thousands.35 Additionally, the common questions among the cases
must be predominantly factual; if the common questions are predominantly
24 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/GeneralInfor-
mation/generalinformation.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
26 See Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Reorganized, THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSL.
OF THE FED. CTS. (Fed. Judiciary), June 2000, at 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/une00ttb/jre
org.html.
27 id.
28 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
29 Id. § 1407(c).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 id.
33 Id. ("The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such hearing at which
material evidence may be offered by any party to an action pending in any district that would
be affected by the proceedings under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact
and conclusions of law based upon such record.").
31 Id. § 1407(a).
" See Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets as of November 4, 2005, http://www.jpml.us
courts.gov/PendingMDLs/PendingMDL-November-05.pdf. However, the number of cases
consolidated has been as low as two. Id.
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legal, the panel will deny transfer.3 6 Similarly, if the cases are exceedingly
distinct from one another, the panel will deny transfer.37 Furthermore, when
determining whether to transfer cases to multidistrict litigation, the judicial
panel considers, in addition to the number of common questions of fact among
the cases, the complexity of the unresolved common questions of fact. 38 . In
sum, for cases to be appropriate for transfer to multidistrict litigation, there
must be a large number of cases pending in many federal district courts that
share among them common questions of fact that are numerous, complex, and
heavily disputed.39
If the judicial panel denies transfer to multidistrict litigation, the panel
files its order denying transfer with the clerk of the court in which the eviden-
tiary hearing occurred.40 When the judicial panel denies a request for transfer
to multidistrict litigation, the affected parties do not have the right to appeal the
decision.4 ' However, if the judicial panel determines transfer to multidistrict
litigation is appropriate, the panel files its order directing transfer both with the
clerk of the court in which the evidentiary hearing occurred, as well as with the
clerk of the transferee district court.42 If a party wishes to appeal the judicial
panel's approval of transfer to multidistrict litigation, that party does have
recourse. The party wishing to appeal the judicial panel's decision to transfer a
case to multidistrict litigation must petition for an extraordinary writ, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction over the transferee district court.4 3
When the judicial panel grants transfer to multidistrict litigation, the panel
is responsible for selecting the transferee court.' The panel may assign the
cases to one or more judges within the transferee district.4 5 The panel does not
decide how the transferee court shall consolidate or handle the transferred cases
once they reach the transferee court; the transferee judge or judges must make
those determinations.46 Once cases are transferred to multidistrict litigation,
36 See, e.g., In re EPA Pesticide Listing Confidentiality Litig., 434 F. Supp. 1235, 1236
(J.P.M.L. 1977) ("On the basis of the record before us, the predominant, and perhaps only,
common aspect in these actions is a legal question of statutory interpretation ... since these
actions involve a common question of law and share few, if any, questions of fact, transfer
under Section 1407 is inappropriate.").
37 See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Prod. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 713, 714 (J.P.M.L. 1985)
("Although we recognize that the actions in this litigation involve some common questions
of fact, we are not persuaded that these common questions of fact will predominate over
individual questions of fact present in each action.").
38 In re Georgeson S'holder Communications, Inc., Share Exch. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1372-73 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (finding that the number and complexity of the common
factual questions did not warrant transfer to multidistrict litigation when other less drastic
alternatives existed).
39 Id.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
41 Id. § 1407(e).
42 Id. § 1407(c).
13 Id. § 1407(e).
44 Id. § 1407(c).
45 Id. § 1407(b).
46 In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 1378, 1384 (J.P.M.L. 1974);
32A AM. JUR. 2 D Federal Courts § 1731 (1995).
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the transferee judge or judges have complete jurisdiction over all discovery and
other pretrial matters.4 7
The foregoing is a synopsis of how new multidistrict litigation proceed-
ings begin. The process is somewhat different, however, when multidistrict
litigation proceedings concerning a certain type of case are already ongoing,
and new plaintiffs subsequently file similar cases in different United States Dis-
trict Courts. Subsequently filed actions are termed "tag-along actions."48 Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Rule 1.1 defines a tag-along action as, "a
civil action pending in a district court and involving common questions of fact
with actions previously transferred under Section 1407."" 9 When tag-along
actions exist, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation need not act in order
for the actions to be consolidated with the ongoing multidistrict litigation pro-
ceedings.5 ° Although the judicial panel can initiate transfer of tag-along
actions sua sponte, the panel's involvement is unnecessary. 5 ' Instead, the
judge of the district court in which the plaintiff filed the action or to which the
defendant removed the action may transfer the action to ongoing multidistrict
litigation proceedings.5" Transfer of tag-along actions to ongoing multidistrict
proceedings is still occurring in diet drug litigation. For example, on October
12, 2004, two United States District Judges for the District of Nevada trans-
ferred, upon defendants' motions, several diet drug cases involving dozens of
plaintiffs to the ongoing diet drug multidistrict litigation proceedings in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 3
The transferee court should have rules governing the treatment of tag-
along actions and incorporation of such actions into the ongoing proceedings.5 4
There are no uniform rules for the treatment of tag-along actions because each
transferee judge determines how pretrial proceedings shall progress in his or
her court. However, some advise that the rules governing tag-along actions
should include three specific rules: 1) tag-along actions become a part of the
consolidated proceedings immediately upon transfer; 2) prior rulings made in
the consolidated proceedings immediately bind the tag-along actions without
the need for separate motions and orders; and 3) previously completed discov-
ery be available for use in the tag-along actions.
5 5
Regardless of how actions get to multidistrict litigation, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation must remand the matters to their respective originat-
47 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1998).
48 Barry, supra note 1, at 65.
49 192 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (2000).
10 Id. at 468-69.
51 Id.; see also Barry, supra note 1, at 65.
52 192 F.R.D. at 468.
53 See, e.g., Barnes v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0686-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Chapman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0701-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Freeman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0681-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004);
Geer v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0683-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Jacobs v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0381-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Apr. 2, 2004); Shroyer v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0696-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004).
54 Barry, supra note 1, at 65.
55 Id.
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ing district courts upon conclusion of pretrial and discovery matters. 56 Addi-
tionally, the judicial panel has authority to separate any claims it deems
appropriate and remand those claims before the conclusion of discovery and
pretrial matters.5 7 Although the statute dictates that the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation "shall" remand the cases to their respective originating
courts upon conclusion of all pretrial matters, this did not always occur and was
an area of great debate for decades. 58 For thirty years, it was common practice
for transferee judges to transfer the actions, over which they presided for con-
solidated pretrial proceedings, to their own courts for trial on the merits.59 This
occurred frequently because after the extensive proceedings that had already
occurred in the transferee courts, the transferee judges often determined the
transferee court was the most convenient forum for trial.60 Accordingly, the
transferee judges often employed the general transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(2000), to keep jurisdiction over the cases for trial. 6 ' Furthermore, as 28
U.S.C. § 1404 motions are pretrial motions, the transferee judges, who had
been assigned to hear all pretrial matters, had discretion to rule on the
62
motions.
For years, this was relatively common practice. In fact, Multidistrict Liti-
gation Rule 14(b) explicitly allowed transferee judges to transfer the cases to
their own courts for trial. 63 As of September 30, 2002, transferee judges had
transferred to their own courts 319 of the consolidated cases requiring trial on
the merits, while 10,062 had been remanded for trial. 64 Nevertheless, many in
the legal community, particularly in academia, opposed the practice of pretrial
judges transferring actions to their own courts for trial on the merits.6 5 Many
people strongly opposed the practice because it blatantly contradicted the plain
language of the multidistrict litigation statute, which states that the judicial
panel "shall" remand cases to their originating district courts for trial.66 In
1998, the Supreme Court ended the debate, siding with much of academia, by
pronouncing that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) mandates that con-
solidated cases be remanded to their originating district courts for trial.67 The
Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach does not necessarily mean, however, that a transferee judge will never
try any of the cases consolidated in his or her court for pretrial proceedings.
56 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that the
authority to remand cases after conclusion of pretrial proceedings rests with the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, not the transferee judge).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d at 142.
58 See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp.JLincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1540
(9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 1532.
60 D. Alan Rudlin, Case Management in Health Claims in Toxic Tort Litigation, SJ065
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTrNUING LEGAL EDUC. 43, 52 (2004).
61 In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d at 1532.
62 Id. at 1533-34.
63 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1998).
6 2002 U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 26.
65 Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. REV. 295,
305-06 (2000).
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
67 Lexecon, Inc., 523 U.S. at 31.
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There is nothing to prevent a judge, to whom the cases have been remanded
after the consolidated pretrial proceedings, from transferring the cases back to
the transferee judge for trial on the merits, pursuant to the general transfer stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404. While there has not been strong empirical evidence to
suggest this will become common, it is nevertheless technically permissible.
As a practical matter, however, remand to the originating district court is
often unnecessary. Most cases consolidated in multidistrict litigation terminate
during the pretrial phase.68 Of the 179,071 actions consolidated in multidistrict
litigation as of September 30, 2002, 129,594 were terminated in the transferee
courts. 6 9 Many cases settle prior to the conclusion of pretrial matters, render-
ing remand unnecessary because the transferee judges have authority to
approve settlements.70
With a basic understanding of how multidistrict litigation functions, the
discussion now turns to diet drug litigation, and its relationship to multidistrict
litigation.
1I. DIET DRUG LITIGATION
In order to use diet drug litigation as a successful model for analyzing the
effectiveness of multidistrict litigation, it is important to understand both the
background of the controversy, i.e. the nature of the drugs and the damage they
allegedly cause, as well as the litigation that has ensued because of the alleged
damages. This section of the Note discusses A) the drugs involved in the con-
troversy, and B) some procedural background of diet drug litigation to date.
A. Background of the Controversy
Fenfluramine, phentermine, and dexfenfluramine are prescription weight
loss drugs designed for the treatment of obesity.7' Fenfluramine, sold under
the trade name Pondimin,®7 2 and dexfenfluramine, sold under the trade name
Redux,®7 3 are appetite suppressants that decrease a patient's appetite by stimu-
lating the release of serotonin in the patient's brain and slowing the body's
depletion of serotonin.74 Phentermine, sold under the trade names Adipex-
p,®75 Fastin,® 76 and Ionamin,® 77 among others, is not an appetite suppres-
68 2002 U.S. Cts. Ann. Rep. 26.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1971).
71 MEDICAL ECONOMICS Co., INC., PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2420, 3126 (52d ed.
1998); Michael Weintraub et al., Long-Term Weight Control: The National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute Funded Multimodal Intervention Study, 51 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 581, 581-85 (May 1992).
72 Pondimin® is property of Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories.
73 Redux® is also property of Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories.
74 Robert Langreth, Critics Claim Diet Clinics Misuse Obesity Drugs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
1997, at B8.
75 Adipex-P® is property of Gate Pharmaceuticals, a division of Teva Pharmaceuticals,
USA.
76 Fastin® is property of SmithKline Beecham Corporation.
77 lonamin® is property of Medeva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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sant, but promotes weight loss by stimulating the nervous system and elevating
the patient's blood pressure.78
Fenfluramine was introduced in the 1950s, phentermine in the 1970s, and
dexfenfluramine in 1996. 7 ' The Food and Drug Administration approved use
of the drugs, individually, but never approved concomitant use of the drugs.80
Although on the market for decades, fenfluramine and phentermine were not
used widely until the mid-nineties. 8' Beginning in 1995, use of fenfluramine
and phentermine skyrocketed.8 2 In contrast to the fifty thousand prescriptions
written per year prior to 1995, pharmacists filled more than eighteen million
prescriptions for fenfluramine and phentermine (or fen-phen, as the combina-
tion came to be known) in 1996 in the United States alone.83 Dexfenfluramine
entered the market in 1996 and sold two million prescriptions during its first
year on the market.84
The drastic increase in use of these drugs resulted from the publication of
Dr. Michael Weintraub's 85 study, which found that, used together, fen-
fluramine and phentermine minimize side effects without compromising the
weight loss effects of the drugs.86 When the drugs are used alone, patients
reported fenfluramine caused drowsiness, while phentermine caused restless-
ness.87 Dr. Weintraub's study revealed, when using fenfluramine and
phentermine in tandem, patients enjoyed drastic weight loss without feeling
drowsy or hyper.8 ' As a result, the drugs became much more popular for obese
patients because, from the patients' perspective, it seemed the drugs had few, if
any, side effects.
Since their use became widespread, dexfenfluramine and the fen-
fluramine-phentermine combination have been increasingly linked to pulmo-
nary hypertension and valvular heart disease. 89 In 1996, studies showed those
who used dexfenfluramine were twenty-three times more likely to develop pul-
monary hypertension than those who did not take the drug.9" On August 22,
1996, the Food and Drug Administration requested the manufacturer and dis-
tributor of dexfenfluramine (Redux®), Interneuron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and
Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, change the product's label to warn physicians and
78 73 AM. JUR. Trials § 485 (2005).
79 Id.
80 FDA Public Health Advisory, Reports of Valvular Heart Disease in Patients Receiving
Concomitant Fenfluramine and Phentermine, http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/phen/phenfen.
htm (July 8, 1997).
81 Between 1992 and 1994, doctors wrote approximately 50,000 prescriptions, per year, of
fenfluramine. 73 Am. JUR. Trials § 485 (2005).
82 Id.
83 Heidi M. Connolly et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated with Fenfluramine-
Phentermine, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 580, 581 (1997).
84 Id.
85 Michael Weintraub, MD, was a researcher at the University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
86 Weintraub, supra note 71, at 581-85.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 E.g., Lucien Abenheim et al., Appetite-Suppressant Drugs and the Risk of Primary Pul-
monary Hypertension, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 609, 609-16 (1996); Connolly et al., supra
note 83, at 581-88.
90 73 AM. JUR. Trials § 485 (2004).
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patients of the increased risk of pulmonary hypertension.9' On July 8, 1997,
the Food and Drug Administration issued a public health advisory warning the
public fenfluramine-phentermine had also been linked to valvular heart
disease.92
B. The Litigation
Since 1997, over eighteen thousand individual lawsuits and one hundred
class actions have been filed in state and federal courts for health problems
allegedly stemming from the use of phentermine, fenfluramine, and dexfen-
fluramine. 93 As these suits usually contain multiple plaintiffs, the actual num-
ber of claims asserted against diet drug defendants is probably much higher
than eighteen thousand. The products liability suits generally assert causes of
action against the drug manufacturers and distributors for strict liability and
breach of warranty, among others. Plaintiffs have also alleged that the drug
manufacturers and distributors committed fraud against the health care provid-
ers and consumers by failing to disclose, or affirmatively concealing, informa-
tion about the drugs' potentially dangerous side effects.94 Plaintiffs have also
asserted that the drug manufacturers and distributors committed fraud against
the Food and Drug Administration, but these claims have been unsuccessful.95
Wyeth-Ayerst, distributor of fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, has endured a
large portion of the litigation.
In addition to drug manufacturers and distributors, it is also common for
plaintiffs to sue their prescribing health care providers, drug company repre-
sentatives, and pharmacists for damages allegedly stemming from the use of
fen-phen and dexfenfluramine. Judges often dismiss many of these defendants
from the lawsuits as many states' learned intermediary doctrines, or other
related statutes, preclude the individuals from liability.9 6 Against the defend-
ants, plaintiffs assert damages including heart problems, as well as complica-
tions further resulting from heart problems.97
In December 1997, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consoli-
dated all of the appropriate diet drug lawsuits pending in federal courts into
multidistrict litigation proceedings in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.98 In 1999, Wyeth-Ayerst entered into a class
91 Id.
92 FDA Public Health Advisory, Reports of Valvular Heart Disease in Patients Receiving
Concomitant Fenfluramine and Phentermine, http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/phen/phenfen.
htm (July 8, 1997).
93 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 385
F.3d 386, 389 (3d Cir. 2004).
9' See, e.g., Bouchard v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 802, 804 (N.D. Ohio
2002).
95 See id. at 812.
96 See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab.
Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding that Mississippi's learned interme-
diary doctrine relieved pharmacies of the duty to warn patients).
97 See, e.g., Bouchard, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 806-07 (claiming, among damages, neurological
injury allegedly resulting from open-heart surgery).
98 In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 385
F.3d at 389.
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action settlement agreement with the multidistrict litigation plaintiffs.99 The
district court certified the class and approved the agreement.' 0 0 Plaintiffs not
wishing to be bound by the terms of the settlement agreement were required to
opt out by March 30, 2004. I01 Those who did not opt out were bound by the
terms of the settlement agreement, which included the provision of a settlement
trust in the amount of $3.75 billion. 10 2 The agreement also allowed for an
intermediate opt out period, during which plaintiffs may opt out after March 30
and pursue individual claims, against which Wyeth-Ayerst may not assert a
statute of limitations defense. If a plaintiff exercises this option, however, she
will be precluded from claiming punitive, exemplary, or multiple damages. 103
Additionally, the agreement provided for back-end opt out rights. Under this
option, a plaintiff whose health problems worsened within the following fifteen
years may, at that time, pursue individual claims against Wyeth-Ayerst, so long
as the plaintiff had not already sought compensation from the settlement trust
and the plaintiffs claims did not include a claim for punitive, exemplary, or
multiple damages."
Litigation continues between those who have opted out of the class action
settlement and Wyeth-Ayerst (not to mention the plaintiffs and many other diet
drug defendants not involved in the Wyeth-Ayerst settlement). As these cases
are still quite numerous, many of the suits that are still pending in federal court
have been transferred to the ongoing multidistrict litigation proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."0 5 Of the
19,725 individual diet drug suits consolidated in multidistrict litigation, case
number MDL-1203, 15,611 of them are still pending in Judge Harvey Bartle
III's court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 10 6
III. DOES MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MEET ITS GOALS? USING DIET DRUG
LITIGATION AS A MODEL TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION.
Multidistrict litigation serves two purposes: 1) increase the "convenience
[for] parties and witnesses," and 2) "promote the just and efficient conduct of
... actions."10 7 Whether multidistrict litigation serves its purposes depends on
who is asked. For some parties (primarily common defendants), multidistrict
litigation is often more convenient, efficient, and potentially just. For others
(primarily plaintiffs and uncommon defendants), multidistrict litigation may
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 390-91.
103 Id. at 390.
104 Id.
105 The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation has transferred many diet drug litigation
cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The cases
were originally heard by Judge Louis C. Bechtle, United States District Judge. See In re
Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp.
2d at 420. However, Judge Bechtle retired on June 30, 2001. Since then, Judge Harvey
Bartle III has overseen the cases. See id. at 420 n.5.
106 Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets as of January 10, 2006, http://www.jpml.us
courts.gov/Pending-MDLs/PendingMDL-January-06.pdf.
107 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
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actually be a hindrance to the convenience, efficiency, and justice of the judi-
cial process. There are many procedural safeguards in place to ensure that mul-
tidistrict litigation meets its goals. For the most part, these safeguards are
largely effective in that they attempt to keep claims unsuited for multidistrict
litigation out of the process. As a result, the only cases that should end up in
multidistrict litigation are those for which multidistrict litigation will help meet
the aforementioned goals. However, as this section of the Note will reveal, the
procedural safeguards may make the litigation process more convenient, just,
and efficient for some defendants; they do little to benefit plaintiffs in terms of
the aforementioned goals. It appears multidistrict litigation is, by its nature,
better for some parties than for others. This section of this Note will use diet
drug litigation as a model to explore some of the ways in which multidistrict
litigation achieves its stated goals, and some of the ways it does not. Part A of
this section analyzes multidistrict litigation's effectiveness with respect to its
first goal: increasing convenience for parties and their witnesses. Part B of this
section analyzes multidistrict litigation's effectiveness with respect to its sec-
ond goal: promoting the just and efficient conduct of transferred actions.
A. Convenience for the Parties and Witnesses
Despite the procedural safeguards in place that seek to ensure that the only
cases that will be transferred to multidistrict litigation are those for which mul-
tidistrict litigation will increase the convenience for the parties or witnesses, it
is inevitable multidistrict litigation will serve this goal more effectively with
respect to some parties than for others. It appears multidistrict litigation is most
convenient for common defendants (defendants named in the vast majority the
suits consolidated in multidistrict litigation). In the context of diet drug litiga-
tion, one common defendant who reaps the benefits of multidistrict litigation is
Wyeth-Ayerst, the distributor of dexfenfluramine and fenfluramine. For
uncommon defendants (defendants named in only a handful of suits-such as
physicians, health care providers, or pharmacists) and their witnesses, multidis-
trict litigation may often be less convenient. However, claims against uncom-
mon defendants are less likely to be transferred to multidistrict litigation
because they are less likely to meet the rigorous commonality requirement that
cases must meet before the judicial panel will transfer them to multidistrict
litigation. The parties for which multidistrict litigation is perhaps the least con-
venient are the plaintiffs and their witnesses. This section of the Note explores
the convenience, or lack thereof, of multidistrict litigation from each of these
parties' perspectives and establishes why common defendants are the only
party for which multidistrict litigation truly increases convenience.
1. Common Defendants' Perspective
For common defendants, primarily the major drug manufacturers and dis-
tributors that produced and marketed fenfluramine, phentermine, and dexfen-
fluramine, multidistrict litigation offers many benefits in the way of
convenience.1 °8 The conveniences Wyeth-Ayerst enjoys by litigating pretrial
108 For the purposes of this section, in the interest of simplicity, the note will use Wyeth-
Ayerst as its model for the "common defendant."
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matters in multidistrict litigation all boil down to one primary benefit: lower
transaction costs incurred when defending itself against diet drug suits. Lower
transaction costs, both monetary and non-monetary, are a top priority to com-
mon diet drug defendants, particularly since so many of the cases settle. As
Wyeth-Ayerst usually ends up paying out for diet drug claims, the only place
the company stands to cut losses significantly is in the mammoth legal fees and
related expenses incurred in defending against the thousands of claims filed
against the company. Because one multidistrict litigation court oversees all
discovery and other pretrial matters, multidistrict litigation reduces many mon-
etary and non-monetary costs for Wyeth-Ayerst. Among the costs that mul-
tidistrict litigation lowers for Wyeth-Ayerst are document production expenses,
legal fees, travel related expenses, and the transaction costs associated with
settlement.
Document production costs are lower for Wyeth-Ayerst when conducting
pretrial and discovery matters in multidistrict litigation than they would be if
the company defended itself in many courts, in thousands of individual cases
around the world. Depending upon how the presiding judge has chosen to con-
solidate the cases for the purposes of multidistrict litigation, it is quite possible
Wyeth-Ayerst will be required to produce fewer replications of the same mater-
ials. This is particularly true if the transferee court has in place a rule similar to
the proposed rule discussed in section I.B of this Note, which suggests that
transferee courts make available to all consolidated parties any documents pro-
duced during previously completed discovery. If the transferee court has such
a rule, Wyeth-Ayerst need not field any duplicative discovery requests as all
the plaintiffs will be given access to the relevant material Wyeth-Ayerst has
already made available. Furthermore, to the extent the transferee court may
allow or require duplicative discovery requests, the presiding judge is so inti-
mately familiar with the issues involved with diet drug cases that he knows
exactly how discovery and other related disputes should resolve. Therefore, the
judge's resolutions will often be quicker, and will certainly be more uniform
than would be the case if dozens of different judges ruled on the same discov-
ery requests. As a result, Wyeth-Ayerst probably knows which battles are
worth fighting, and can save resources by not opposing requests the company
knows it will lose. Additionally, because of the uniformity of the rulings and
the likelihood Wyeth-Ayerst has already had to produce the same documents
for different parties in different suits, the company has very likely already pro-
duced the documents that will be necessary for each suit.
The potential decrease in document production costs is substantial.
Wyeth-Ayerst must not only produce fewer documents, but also dedicate fewer
person-hours to researching and cataloguing the whereabouts of certain docu-
ments. Given the size and number of diet drug cases, a decrease in production
costs across the board could result in considerable savings, in time and money,
to Wyeth-Ayerst.
In relation to lower document production costs, Wyeth-Ayerst's legal fees
decrease substantially in multidistrict litigation. The company's attorneys have
far fewer motions to file, respond to, or otherwise address in multidistrict litiga-
tion than they otherwise would because hundreds or thousands of cases are
consolidated for discovery and other pretrial proceedings. Additionally,
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because the same judge decides all matters, the rulings will be uniform, thereby
reducing Wyeth-Ayerst's need to pursue certain interlocutory appeals or
motions to reconsider. Additionally, because the judge is so familiar with the
cases, he may be able to rule more expeditiously on discovery-related motions
than other judges who are less familiar with diet drug litigation, thereby short-
ening the length of the litigation overall. Finally, because all the matters are
centralized, Wyeth-Ayerst may allot far fewer attorneys to the litigation than
may otherwise be the case.
Furthermore, the certainty Wyeth-Ayerst gains by having one judge rule
uniformly on all discovery and pretrial matters offers an invaluable benefit in
the way of reducing legal fees. To the extent that Wyeth-Ayerst's legal team
spends time and money strategizing about which pretrial motions to file, refrain
from filing, strongly oppose, or concede to, based on a judge's likelihood of
granting the motions, the benefit of knowing and being able to predict one
judge, as opposed to hundreds, is huge. With only one judge to study and
predict, Wyeth-Ayerst can spend much less time analyzing the judge's prior
conduct in unrelated actions. It would not take long for Wyeth-Ayerst to learn
the preferences and likely rulings of one judge. While the presiding judge of
the diet drug litigation cases retired midway through the litigation, Wyeth-
Ayerst nevertheless had the benefit of only having to predict the rulings of two
judges, as opposed to dozens or hundreds of judges. From a common defen-
dant's perspective, being able to anticipate rulings is a key benefit in keeping
litigation costs down.
Travel related expenses will decrease drastically in multidistrict litigation
as well. Instead of requiring legal counsel and defendants to travel from juris-
diction to jurisdiction making the same arguments repeatedly, the parties and
their attorneys may restrict their travel to one location, and will probably be
required to travel for proceedings much less often than if there were eighteen
thousand separate proceedings to which the parties must travel. In relation,
because many cases have historically remained in multidistrict litigation for
trial, these savings have extended to the trial phase of the litigation as well.
Finally, Wyeth-Ayerst's transaction costs also lower substantially with
respect to settlement negotiations and offers. The company may negotiate, in
essence, with all its opponents simultaneously, as opposed to conducting
thousands of separate negotiations. To illustrate, it was out of multidistrict liti-
gation proceedings the $3.75 billion settlement, discussed in section II.B of this
Note, was born. That settlement bound thousands of plaintiffs, without requir-
ing thousands of separate negotiations. This is not to say Wyeth-Ayerst does
not still have a huge job defending itself in multidistrict litigation and con-
ducting settlement negotiations with the thousands of diet drug plaintiffs
involved in multidistrict litigation, but the job may be slightly more convenient
in multidistrict litigation than it would be in thousands of individual suits.
Not only does multidistrict litigation make litigation more convenient for
Wyeth-Ayerst, but also the company's witnesses benefit. Diet drug litigation
involves many witnesses who will be common to many of the suits filed against
Wyeth-Ayerst. Among these common witnesses are expert witnesses, who tes-
tify to causation, or lack thereof, and company executives and employees.
These witnesses may need to testify at evidentiary hearings, and it is much
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more convenient for these witnesses if the evidentiary matters are all decided
by the same court. Because the hearings are all in front of the same judge, the
number of hearings will be notably smaller. Accordingly, Wyeth-Ayerst's wit-
nesses will be required to testify far fewer times than they would if the litiga-
tion was not consolidated in multidistrict litigation.
However, Wyeth-Ayerst may also suffer some inconveniences as a result
of multidistrict litigation. Specifically, because Plaintiffs usually prefer not to
have pretrial matters decided in multidistrict litigation (for the reasons estab-
lished infra, section III.B.3), frequently Wyeth-Ayerst must jump additional
procedural hurdles in its effort to get the cases transferred to multidistrict litiga-
tion. Specifically, some plaintiffs fraudulently join defendants in an effort to
defeat diversity and avoid multidistrict litigation.'° 9 As a result, Wyeth-Ayerst
must move for removal from state to federal court on the basis of fraudulent
joinder, defend against plaintiffs' inevitable motion to remand, and establish
that plaintiffs have, in fact, fraudulently joined parties. To illustrate, hundreds
of plaintiffs recently fraudulently joined non-diverse defendants in dozens of
diet drug suits in Nevada in order to destroy diversity to avoid both removal to
federal court and transfer to multidistrict litigation. 10 Wyeth-Ayerst removed
the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada and then
fought plaintiffs' motions to remand because the plaintiffs had fraudulently
joined a non-diverse defendant against whom the statute of repose had run out
years earlier. After dismissal of the fraudulently joined plaintiffs, several of the
cases were transferred, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1404, to the ongoing diet drug
'09 E.g., In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig.,
220 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (finding that plaintiffs had fraudulently joined non-diverse pharma-
cists and drug representatives whom the learned intermediary doctrine precluded from
liability).
110 See, e.g., Barnes v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0686-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Chapman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0701-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Freeman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0681-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004);
Geer v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0683-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Jacobs v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0381-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Apr. 2, 2004); Kimbrough v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0819-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Shroyer v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0696-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Bartlett v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
CV-S-04-0687-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Berry v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-
0423-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. filed Apr. 16, 2004); Burek v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0700-
LDG-RJJ (D. Nev. filed June 3, 2004); Cronin v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0422-HDM-
LRL (D. Nev. filed Apr. 8, 2004); Dirienzo v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0703-KJD-LRL
(D. Nev. filed June 3, 2004); Edmundson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0704-PMP-PAL (D.
Nev. filed May 26, 2004); Figueredo v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0677-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev.
filed May 26, 2004); Holdren v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0680-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed
May 25, 2004); Hoyle v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0678-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 24,
2004); Nail v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0674-RCJ-GWF (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004);
Nitti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0673-KJD-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 27, 2004); Neuman v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0676-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 28, 2004); O'Keefe v.
Wyeth, Inc., No.CV-S-04-0690-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Overton v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0691-RCJ-RJJ (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Simpson v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. CV-S-04-0695-JKDJ-LRL (D. Nev. filed June 3, 2004); Taylor v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-
S-04-0698-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Torres v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-
0699-LDG-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 24, 2004); Waggoner v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-
0693-LDG-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 27, 2004).
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multidistrict litigation proceedings in the eastern district of Pennsylvania.'
Those cases are still pending in the eastern district of Pennsylvania. Others are
still pending in the district of Nevada."
2
Furthermore, it is most frequently the defendants, not plaintiffs, who move
for the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consider transfer, which is
one more, albeit minor, procedural step Wyeth-Ayerst must take in its effort to
get to multidistrict litigation.
The convenience multidistrict litigation offers to common defendants,
however, outweighs the procedural inconveniences they may experience in
their attempt to get to multidistrict litigation because the procedural inconve-
niences are minor while the benefits are substantial. This is largely because
fraudulent joinder, or some other manner of destroying diversity to stay out of
federal court is likely to occur, regardless of multidistrict litigation. Diet drug
plaintiffs, like all other plaintiffs, generally prefer to be in state court as
opposed to federal court. Not only is this evinced by the fact that diet drug
plaintiffs continually file their suits in state courts, but also studies have shown
that a large percentage of plaintiffs believe rulings will more likely favor them
in state court, while defendants often believe the rulings will more likely favor
them in federal court.' 3 This being the case, plaintiffs will join non-diverse
defendants to destroy diversity just to stay out of federal court, regardless of
whether multidistrict litigation is a possibility. The potential of going to mul-
tidistrict litigation may give plaintiffs an additional reason to try to stay out of
federal court but, realistically, plaintiffs are likely to try to destroy diversity
anyway.
For the foregoing reasons, multidistrict litigation frequently meets its goal
of increasing convenience for common defendants and their witnesses because
ill See, e.g., Barnes v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0686-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Chapman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0701-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12,
2004); Freeman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0681-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004);
Geer v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0683-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Jacobs v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0381-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Apr. 2, 2004); Kimbrough v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0819-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004); Shroyer v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0696-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. filed Oct. 12, 2004).
112 See e.g., Bartlett v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0687-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 25,
2004); Berry v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0423-RLH-PAL (D. Nev. filed Apr. 16, 2004);
Burek v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0700-LDG-RJJ (D. Nev. filed June 3, 2004); Cronin v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0422-HDM-LRL (D. Nev. filed Apr. 8, 2004); Dirienzo v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0703-KJD-LRL (D. Nev. filed June 3, 2004); Edmundson v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0704-PMP-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 26, 2004); Figueredo v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0677-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. filed May 26, 2004); Holdren v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. CV-S-04-0680-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Hoyle v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
CV-S-04-0678-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 24, 2004); Nail v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-
0674-RCJ-GWF (D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Nitti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0673-
KJD-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 27, 2004); Neuman v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0676-RLH-
LRL (D. Nev. filed May 28, 2004); O'Keefe v. Wyeth, Inc., No.CV-S-04-0690-RCJ-LRL
(D. Nev. filed May 25, 2004); Overton v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0691-RCJ-RJJ (D. Nev.
filed May 25, 2004); Simpson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0695-JKDJ-LRL (D. Nev. filed
June 3 2004); Taylor v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0698-RCJ-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 25,
2004); Torres v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0699-LDG-PAL (D. Nev. filed May 24, 2004);
Waggoner v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CV-S-04-0693-LDG-LRL (D. Nev. filed May 27, 2004).
''3 See Miller, supra note 6, at 417.
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multidistrict litigation decreases monetary costs and time for common defend-
ants and their witnesses. In contrast, the procedural inconveniences common
defendants endure during their attempt to get to multidistrict litigation are
minor.
2. Uncommon Defendants' Perspective
For uncommon defendants and their witnesses, multidistrict litigation may
prove to be more of an inconvenience than a convenience. However, there is
an effective procedural safeguard in place that largely prevents uncommon
defendants from having to endure the inconveniences of multidistrict litigation.
Uncommon defendants in diet drug cases are usually prescribing doctors and
other health care providers. Many of the diet drug cases consolidated have in
common the major drug manufacturers, and/or distributors, but vary greatly
with respect to other named defendants. As a result of multidistrict litigation,
these individual defendants and their witnesses must travel for proceedings in
Pennsylvania, as opposed to defending themselves in their home jurisdictions.
As a result of conducting discovery and pretrial matters in Pennsylvania as
well as litigating in the doctor's home jurisdiction, the defendants incur not
only travel expenses, but also increased legal expenses. Increased legal
expenses can result either from paying for local counsel to travel from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction or from hiring counsel in Pennsylvania in addition to local
counsel.
Additionally, uncommon defendants do not reap all of the benefits from
multidistrict litigation that common defendants enjoy. Specifically, unlike
common defendants, who might be required to travel to defend themselves in
multiple jurisdictions regardless of multidistrict litigation, uncommon defend-
ants' alternative to flying to Pennsylvania to defend themselves in multidistrict
litigation is staying in their own home jurisdictions to defend against the suits.
However, uncommon defendants may enjoy some of the benefits of mul-
tidistrict litigation. For example, like drug manufacturing companies, although
to a lesser degree, it is likely some medical providers are also engaged in
numerous suits. If this is the case, these medical providers could also benefit
from consolidation of all the suits against which they are defending, for the
purpose of discovery and pretrial matters. However, in multidistrict litigation,
it is likely that each medical provider's cases will be consolidated with cases in
which that medical provider has no involvement, which could prove inconve-
nient. Consolidation may slow the process for uncommon defendants because
uncommon defendants must sit idly by while the court deals with matters com-
pletely unrelated to the uncommon defendants' cases.
Another benefit of multidistrict litigation that uncommon defendants,
namely medical providers, also enjoy is the convenience of having all pretrial
and discovery matters decided by a judge who is intimately familiar with diet
drug litigation. This is less beneficial for uncommon defendants than it is for
common defendants, however, because the judge is not as intimately familiar
with each individual physician's role in the litigation as he is with the drug
manufacturers' role in the litigation. As a result, the uncommon defendants do
not benefit, in the same way that Wyeth-Ayerst does, from uniform, expedi-
tious rulings. Additionally, the judge may not be as sympathetic to the uncom-
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mon defendants' arguments as he is to Wyeth-Ayerst's arguments if he is less
familiar with them. The multidistrict litigation judge has spent years presiding
over Wyeth-Ayerst's issues with respect to diet drug litigation; however, each
small medical provider who gets ensnared in multidistrict litigation presents
new facets to the litigation that the judge may not, until that point, have had
reason to consider. Accordingly, while multidistrict litigation may offer some
increased conveniences for uncommon defendants, it may be, in some circum-
stances, less convenient for uncommon defendants than litigating claims sepa-
rately in their home jurisdictions.
While it appears multidistrict litigation may fail to serve its goal of
increasing convenience for some uncommon defendants, there is a statutory
safeguard in place that, when effective, prevents uncommon defendants from
the inconveniences it may suffer in multidistrict litigation. The safeguard is
that the statute was drafted to exclude uncommon defendants from participating
in multidistrict litigation. Because the statute requires that actions transferred
to multidistrict litigation must contain numerous common questions of fact, it is
unlikely that actions against individual physicians and other uncommon
defendants will be consolidated in multidistrict litigation with suits against
Wyeth-Ayerst because the questions of fact will differ substantially as between
the different defendants. To illustrate, the factual questions involving Wyeth-
Ayerst will center around what the company knew, or should have known,
about potential side effects of dexfenfluramine and causation. In contrast, fac-
tual questions involving uncommon defendants will often center around what
each individual defendant knew, or should have known, about the potential side
effects of the drugs, which will differ substantially from what the manufacturer
or distributor of the drugs knew.
Even if claims against uncommon defendants are transferred to multidis-
trict litigation, the statute was drafted to provide the judicial panel with the
discretion to separate and remand any claims the panel deems appropriate at
any time during the pretrial proceedings.114 Accordingly, many claims against
uncommon defendants are remanded to their originating district courts and the
uncommon defendants are not burdened by the potential inconveniences of
conducting pretrial matters in multidistrict litigation. This procedural safeguard
appears to protect uncommon defendants from any inconvenience they may
suffer in multidistrict litigation. In the event the procedural safeguard works,
the only inconvenience the uncommon defendants may suffer is having to par-
ticipate in the evidentiary hearing to contest practicability of transferring claims
against them to multidistrict litigation.
While participating in multidistrict litigation appears to be less convenient
for uncommon defendants than individually defending themselves in multiple
actions, the likelihood of uncommon defendants having to participate in mul-
tidistrict litigation is slim. Accordingly, it appears multidistrict litigation
achieves its goal of increased convenience with respect to uncommon defend-
ants by effectively excluding them from participating.
114 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
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3. Plaintiffs' Perspective
Multidistrict litigation does not increase convenience to plaintiffs or their
witnesses. It actually seems to do the opposite. It is apparent that plaintiffs
prefer not to participate in multidistrict litigation by the fact that plaintiffs gen-
erally file their diet drug actions in state court as opposed to federal, thereby
rendering themselves ineligible for consideration for transfer to multidistrict
litigation.' 15 While plaintiffs benefit from having a judge with vast experience
in the area of diet drug litigation, there are far more inconveniences for plain-
tiffs involved in multidistrict litigation that outweigh the benefit that an exper-
ienced judge may provide.
Multidistrict litigation, in essence, removes the plaintiffs' ability to select
the fora in which they wish to litigate their disputes. When filing individual
suits, plaintiffs are able to file in whichever jurisdiction is most convenient
because personal jurisdiction exists over Wyeth-Ayerst and most other com-
mon diet drug defendants just about everywhere in the Nation. Plaintiffs, of
course, file in the forum they find most convenient. By removing the action to
a jurisdiction hundreds or thousands of miles away, plaintiffs are obviously
inconvenienced.
If plaintiffs found the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convenient, they
would have filed there; but they did not. By forcing plaintiffs to litigate in an
inconvenient forum, the plaintiffs incur greater expenses associated with travel-
ing, and the potential need to hire additional legal counsel.
Multidistrict litigation is similarly inconvenient for plaintiffs' witnesses.
Like the plaintiffs themselves, the plaintiffs' witnesses vary greatly from case
to case. To the extent that these witnesses participate in any pretrial matters,
they must travel to a foreign jurisdiction, which is inconvenient. Furthermore,
if the case remains in the transferee court for trial on the merits, the plaintiffs'
witnesses are further inconvenienced by having to travel for a potentially long
trial.
Multidistrict litigation is not without its benefits for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
whose cases are transferred to multidistrict litigation benefit from the judge's
expertise in the area of diet drug litigation just as defendants benefit. Further-
more, if the presiding judge has decided to make all relevant, previously dis-
covered material available to all plaintiffs, the newer plaintiffs benefit from not
having to file discovery requests and fight with defendants over certain docu-
ments. This is the case because the judge will have already ruled with respect
to certain documents and, if discoverable, the plaintiffs will already have access
to those documents.
Despite the few benefits multidistrict litigation may offer to plaintiffs, they
do not counteract the detriment of being forced to litigate in a forum not of
their choosing, which may be thousands of miles from their home jurisdictions.
For this reason, multidistrict litigation does not appear to serve its goal of con-
venience to the parties and their witnesses as far as plaintiffs are concerned.
However, it does appear to serve the goal of increased convenience for defend-
' 1 As noted earlier, diet drug plaintiffs prefer to be in state court over federal court regard-
less of multidistrict litigation, but multidistrict litigation provides an additional incentive for
plaintiffs to attempt to stay in state court.
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ants. This is exactly as could have been expected, given the fight that plaintiffs
often put up in an effort to avoid multidistrict litigation.
B. Just and Efficient Conduct of Actions
While 28 U.S.C. § 1407 lists as the second fundamental goal of multidis-
trict litigation the "just and efficient conduct of... actions," there is something
counter-intuitive about suggesting that justice and efficiency are equally impor-
tant goals. Although Congress was exceedingly concerned with efficiency
when it drafted 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the wake of 1900 similar antitrust actions,
it cannot be suggested that justice was ever intended to take a back seat. As the
interests of efficiency and justice do not always necessarily align, they receive
separate consideration in this section of the Note.
1. Efficient Conduct of Actions
Multidistrict litigation serves its second fundamental goal of ensuring the
efficient conduct of actions quite effectively. However, once again, the plain-
tiffs are the ones least served by multidistrict litigation.
Multidistrict litigation proves efficient as far as common defendants are
concerned for many of the reasons discussed in section III.A.1 of this Note.
Fewer fora require less work and less travel, and therefore are more efficient
than the alternative. There is also less duplicative work when Wyeth-Ayerst
defends itself in multidistrict litigation as opposed to individual suits in multi-
ple jurisdictions.
Similarly, uncommon defendants enjoy more efficient treatment of their
suits as a result of multidistrict litigation. As noted in section III.A.2, the
uncommon defendants in diet drug litigation often do not participate in mul-
tidistrict litigation proceedings because the panel separates and remands the
claims against uncommon defendants to their respective originating district
courts. The uncommon defendants, then, defend themselves in their home
jurisdictions, without dealing with the hassle of participating in massive litiga-
tion with Wyeth-Ayerst as a defendant. This is undoubtedly quicker and more
efficient for these defendants. Additionally, all of the parties involved in mul-
tidistrict litigation benefit from having a judge with particular experience in the
area of diet drug litigation preside over their discovery, pretrial, and potentially,
trial proceedings. Accordingly, the process becomes more efficient because of
the judge's expertise.
Plaintiffs, however, may suffer here as well. Prosecution of plaintiffs'
claims against Wyeth-Ayerst may not be more efficient because instead of
being the only plaintiff, or one of a handful of plaintiffs prosecuting a claim,
each plaintiff is now one of thousands, vying for results from the same suit.
This likely ties things up for each individual plaintiff.
Multidistrict litigation, however, is more efficient for society as a whole.
Consolidation of thousands of claims in one court benefits judicial economy.
Furthermore, it takes fewer hours, total, to resolve all of the cases than if each
was handled separately. In this respect, multidistrict litigation absolutely serves
the intent Congress had when enacting the statute, which was to prevent simul-
taneous similar actions from being litigated in courts across the country.
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2. Just Conduct of Actions
There are two primary justice concerns related to multidistrict litigation.
First, from a plaintiffs perspective, multidistrict litigation may not seem to
promote the just conduct of actions because by litigating in the multidistrict
forum, plaintiffs are often precluded from litigating in the forum of their
choice. However, from the public's perspective, multidistrict litigation offers a
major benefit in the role of uniform rulings for similarly situated plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a plaintiffs right to bring his
claims in the forum of his choice." 6 Most often, it is not the plaintiffs choice
to litigate pretrial matters in multidistrict litigation." 7 In fact, the consensus
among plaintiffs is that multidistrict litigation is to be avoided at all costs." 8
Accordingly, requiring plaintiffs who, in the diet drug context, are usually indi-
viduals with limited resources, to litigate in a forum often hundreds if not
thousands of miles away from the forum of their choice may be viewed as
unjust.
On the other hand, multidistrict litigation produces more uniform deci-
sions, which comports with society's idea that a just court system should treat
those in similar circumstances similarly. Given the similarity of the diet drug
cases consolidated in multidistrict litigation, it could be seen as unjust if differ-
ent judges ruled differently with respect to identical pretrial motions. Such
divergent rulings would be inevitable if the thousands of diet drug cases consol-
idated in multidistrict proceedings were litigated separately before hundreds of
different judges.
CONCLUSION
From examining its effect on diet drug litigation, it appears multidistrict
litigation is largely successful in serving its fundamental goals of increasing
convenience for the parties and witnesses and ensuring the just and efficient
conduct of actions. Multidistrict litigation is often more convenient for com-
mon defendants than the alternative of litigating thousands of cases in hundreds
of jurisdictions. Additionally, to the extent that uncommon defendants are pre-
cluded from participating in multidistrict litigation proceedings, the procedure
may actually make litigation more convenient for uncommon defendants as
well. However, multidistrict litigation inconveniences plaintiffs by forcing
them to litigate in a forum that is often several states away from the forum of
their choice. Multidistrict litigation is undoubtedly more efficient than the
alternative both for defendants and for society, collectively. Again, however,
plaintiffs do not reap the benefit that defendants do because in multidistrict
litigation each plaintiff becomes a much less significant piece of a much larger
picture, thereby prolonging each plaintiffs role in the litigation. Finally, mul-
tidistrict litigation serves its fundamental goal of increasing justice in that it
produces more uniform results. However, uniform results are obtained at the
cost of preventing plaintiffs from exercising their rights to litigate in the fora of
116 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 440 (1979) (recognizing a plaintiff's right to
initiate claims in the forum of his choice).
117 See generally Presby & Anderson, supra note 2, at 2175.
118 Id.
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their choice. Generally, multidistrict litigation appears to be a somewhat defen-
dant-friendly procedure. Nevertheless, it benefits everyone, in some way, and
its overall benefits, including its societal benefits, arguably outweigh any hard-
ships it may impose. It seems inevitable that as long as diet drug litigation
ensues, defendants will continue to fight to get to multidistrict litigation, while
plaintiffs will continue to oppose transfer. Once there, however, multidistrict
litigation will largely continue to serve the goals it was enacted to fulfill.
